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UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION:

THE OHIO SUPREME
COURT RULES ON THE USE OF THE STATUS QUO TEST FOR DETERMINING WHEN A WORK STOPPAGE IS DUE TO A LOCK-

OUT-Bays v. Shenango Co., 53 Ohio St. 3d 132, 559 N.E.2d
740 (1990).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Whether an unemployed individual is entitled to unemployment
compensation benefits is an issue of great concern for both the worker
and the employer.' When a work stoppage ensues, payment of unemployment compensation benefits to an idled worker depends upon an
administrative or judicial interpretation of the state's labor dispute disqualification provision. Under Ohio's labor dispute disqualification provision, a worker is ineligible for unemployment benefits if his unemployment is "due to a labor dispute other than a lockout." 2 Ohio's
unemployment compensation statute, however, is silent with respect to
what constitutes a lockout. In Bays v. Shenango Company,' the Ohio
Supreme Court ruled that the status quo test, created by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Erie Forge & Steel Corporationv. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Vrotney Unemployment Compensation Case)" and first adopted in Ohio by the Cuyahoga County
Court of Appeals in Oriti v. Board of Review, 5 is the proper standard
by which to determine whether a work stoppage is due to a labor dispute other than a lockout.
The concept of status quo encourages parties to a pre-existing collective bargaining agreement to continue functioning under the terms
and conditions of that agreement, following its expiration, when no new
agreement has been formed. During the interim period, the status quo
standard encourages the parties to continue negotiations in good faith
1. In the case of the worker who is ineligible for benefits, it is not difficult to imagine the
terrifying dangers posed by unemployment. Yet, the employer is not without his own concerns.
Employers indirectly bear the burden of paying for their employees' unemployment benefits
through unemployment insurance premiums. Comment, Unemployment Benefits Laid-Off Workers and Labor Disputes: The Unemployment Benefit Conflict, 19 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 737, 737
n.1 (1983).
2. OHIO REV.CODE ANN. § 4141.29(D)(1)(a) (Anderson 1991). Ohio's labor dispute disqualification provision is contained in Ohio's Unemployment Compensation Act. Id. §§ 4141.01.99. For a general discussion of Ohio's Unemployment Compensation Act, see infra notes 8-41
and accompanying text. For a background discussion concerning court interpretations of Ohio's
labor dispute disqualification provision, see infra notes 81-141 and accompanying text.
3. 53 Ohio St. 3d 132, 559 N.E.2d 740 (1990).
4. 400 Pa. 440, 163 A.2d 91 (1960).
5. 7 Ohio App. 3d 311, 455 N.E.2d 720 (1983).
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for a new agreement. In Bays, the court held that an offer made by a
union to continue working under the terms of a pre-existing agreement,
including cost-of-living adjustments, for the period of one year, was an
offer to maintain the status quo.' Because the union offered to maintain
the status quo, the court ruled that a subsequent work stoppage was
due to a lockout, thereby entitling employees to unemployment compensation benefits.'
This note examines and analyzes the Bays decision. It determines
that the Bays court failed to properly apply Pennsylvania precedent
regarding the status quo test without explaining why the court chose to
deviate from settled Pennsylvania case law. The first part of this note
briefly discusses Ohio's Unemployment Compensation Act. The note
then specifically focuses upon the labor dispute disqualification provisions contained in both the Pennsylvania and Ohio acts. Additionally, it
sets forth Pennsylvania's and Ohio's treatment of their disqualification
provisions.
The second portion of this note centers on the Bays decision itself.
This note argues that the Bays court appropriately validated the status
quo test for use in Ohio unemployment compensation disputes, but erroneously decided that: (1) the concept of status quo includes cost-ofliving adjustments; (2) a one year extension of the terms and conditions
of a pre-existing agreement represents a reasonable period under the
concept of status quo; and (3) the status quo test requires an analysis
of the employer's offer to maintain the status quo. This note asserts
that the Bays decision represents an unexplained deviation from Pennsylvania precedent and posits that the decision will cause confusion in
the area of unemployment compensation, thereby creating more litigation over issues within this area of the law. The Ohio courts should be
encouraged to tailor the concept of status quo to fit the needs of Ohio.
This note recommends, however, that future decisions breaking from
Pennsylvania precedent regarding the status quo test should set forth
better explanations concerning the need to deviate from settled Pennsylvania case law. Such explanations would provide more certainty in
the law and would furnish less incentive for costly litigation.

6. Bays, 53 Ohio St. 3d at 136, 559 N.E.2d at 744.
7. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/9
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BACKGROUND

Basic Structure of Ohio's Unemployment Compensation Act

1. General Coverage
The Ohio Unemployment Compensation Act8 (the Act), in general, covers employers: (1) with at least one employee engaging in employment covered by the Act for any portion of a day in each of twenty
weeks in a calendar year whether or not the same employee works for
that period, or (2) who paid wages to employees in employment covered by the Act equaling or in excess of $1,500 during any calendar
quarter in the calendar year.9 "Employment" is defined as "[s]ervices
performed for wages under any contract of hire, written or oral, express
or implied."'" Employment covered by the Act includes services performed by an individual for an employer within the state."
The rate at which an employer must contribute to the unemployment compensation fund depends, to some degree, upon how often its
employees have been entitled to benefits.' 2 An employer pays an average contribution rate until that employer has benefits charged to it's
account for four consecutive calendar quarters by June 30 of the "contribution period."'" At that time, the employer graduates to a higher
level of contribution.' 4 Employers, therefore, have a direct interest in
15
contesting their employees' claims for benefits.
2.

Benefits

In order to obtain benefits, claimants must show that they are unemployed through no fault of their own, 6 that they worked for a period
8. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4141.01-.99 (Anderson 1991). For a thorough discussion of
Ohio's Unemployment Compensation Act, see Klein, Unemployment Insurance in Ohio, 11 U.
TOL. L. REV. 27 (1979).
9. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4141.01(A)(1)(a), (b). Nonprofit organizations are also covered if they had at least four employees for twenty calendar weeks in a calendar year. Id. §
4141.01(A)(l)(a).
10. Id. § 4141.01(B)(i)(a).
11. Id. § 4141.01(B)(2). Special provisions exist for many types of employment such as
domestic services, agricultural services, government bodies, and school employees. See id. Certain
types of employment are specifically excluded from the Act's reach as well. See id. §
4141.01(B)(3).
12. Id. § 4141.25(B).
13. Id. "'Contribution period' means the calendar year beginning on the first day of January of any year." Id. § 4141.01(U).
14. Id. §§ 4141.25(B),(C).
15. Klein, supra note 8, at 32.
16. For a discussion of this proposition and a list of court decisions stating that the major
purpose of the Unemployment Compensation Act is to alleviate the. hardships of unemployment
for those by
whoeCommons,
have become 1990
unemployed through no fault of their own, see infra notes 180-84 and
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long enough to claim benefits under the Act, and that they are able,
available, and actively seeking work in the locality where they were
employed prior to being laid off; or, if they have left that locality, in a
locality where suitable work is normally performed.17 Furthermore,
claimants do not become eligible for benefits until they have served a
waiting period of one week. 18 Once determined eligible, the measure of
a claimant's benefits is the number of weeks that the claimant has
worked and the claimant's gross wages earned during the "base
period."'"
To receive benefits during the "benefit year," claimants must file a
claim for each separate week of unemployment.2 0 In addition, claimants must comply with a long list of statutory requirements including
the requirement that claimants may not be unemployed due to a labor
dispute other than a lockout." Claimants, however, may obtain benefits
if they demonstrate that they are not directly interested in the labor
dispute.2" Claimants also may obtain benefits if they can show that
their employer was not involved in the labor dispute, but had his place
of business at the location where another employer was engaged in a
labor dispute, so long as the former employer is not wholly owned by
an employer who is involved in the labor dispute.2 3
3.

Benefit Determination and Procedure for Appeal

A claimant begins the procedure for determining benefits by filing
an application for benefits with the local Ohio Bureau of Employment
Services (OBES). 2" OBES will then send the claimant information explaining the claimant's rights and the appeal process.2 5 OBES will also
send notice to the employer that a filing has been made and will inform
the employer of its right to attend a fact finding interview prior to any

17. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.29(A)(4)(a).
18. Id. § 4141.29(B).
19. Id. § 4141.01(Q). - 'Base period' means the first four of the last five completed calendar
quarters immediately preceding the first day of an individual's benefit year .
Id.
20. Id. 9 4141.29(A).
21. Id. § 4141.29(D)(1)(a). For a background discussion concerning court interpretations of
Ohio's labor dispute disqualification provision, see infra notes 81-141 and accompanying text. Additional bases upon which claimants will be denied benefits include: unemployment due to disciplinary reasons, quitting without just cause, refusing to accept an offer of suitable work without good
cause, quitting for domestic reasons, obtaining benefits through falsehood or misrepresentation,
unemployment due to commitment in a penal institution, and unemployment because of dishonesty in connection with prior work. Id. §§ 4141.29(D)(1)-(2).
22. Id. § 4141.29(D)(1)(a)(i).
23. Id. § 4141.29(D)(1)(a)(ii).
24. Id. § 4141.28(A); see Klein, supra note 8, at 46.
25. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.28(B).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/9
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determination of benefits. 6 Following the interviewing process, all interested parties will receive a Determination of Application for Benefit
Rights (Determination)." If benefits are allowed, these Determinations
will contain a statement of the claimant's average weekly wage, the
weekly benefit amount, the total benefits payable, and the beginning of
the benefit year.2 8 In addition, an employer's determination will contain
a statement of the total amount of benefits that may be charged to its
account.2 9
Any interested party who is notified of an OBES Determination of
benefit rights may apply for a reconsideration."0 Upon a request for
reconsideration, the Administrator of OBES may .refer the matter to
the Board of Review as an appeal if he decides that the matter necessitates a hearing. 1 This occurs infrequently, however, as most reconsiderations are ruled upon by the Reconsideration Branch of the OBES. 2
Any interested party may appeal the Administrator's decision on
reconsideration to the Board of Review. 3 At the administrative level,
there are two stages of appeal. 4 Initially, a referee hears and decides
all appeals. 36 Following this, an appellant may file an application to
institute a further appeal in which the Board, if it chooses to allow the
further appeal, will review the decision36 of the referee and must either
affirm, reverse, or modify the decision.
Any interested party may appeal from the decision of the Board to
the court of common pleas.3 7 The appeal is heard upon the transcript of

26. Id.
27. Id. § 4141.28(C) Interested parties include the claimant and any employer to whom
notices must be sent. See id. §§ 4141.01(I), 4141.28(C).
28. Klein, supra note 8, at 46-47.
29. Id.; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.28(C).
30. Id. § 4141.28(G)(1). Applications for reconsideration must be in writing and must be
filed within twenty-one calendar days after notice was mailed to the interested party's last known
post-office address. Id.
31. Id. § 4141.28(G)(2); see Klein, supra note 8, at 48.
32. Klein, supra note 8, at 48.
33. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.28(H). Appeals must be filed within twenty-one calendar
days following the mailing of the decision on reconsideration to the appellant. Id. The decision is
final if the appellant fails to file in a timely manner. Id.
34. Klein, supra note 8, at 51; see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4141.28(I), (J), (M).
35. Klein, supra note 8, at 51.
36. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.28(M).
37. Id. § 4141.28(0). Appeals must be made within thirty days after notice of the decision
of the Board is mailed to the last known post-office address of all interested parties. Id. An appeal
must be taken in the county where the appellant, if an employee, is a resident or was last employed, or, if an employer, is a resident or has its principle place of business in the state. Id. A
Notice of Appeal must be filed with the Clerk of the court of common pleas, with the Board, and
must be sent to all interested parties by registered mail. Id. The Board may, by petition, be made
appeal. Id.1990
a party by
to such
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the record as certified by the Board. 8 The court can reverse and vacate
the decision of the Board, or modify such decision and enter final judgment only if the court finds that the decision was unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence.3 9 Otherwise, the
court must affirm the decision." As in civil cases, any interested party
may appeal the decision of the court.4 1
B.

Interpretationof Labor Dispute Disqualification Provisions

One area of benefit determination which has been the subject of
judicial attention is the labor dispute disqualification provision. Because
the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Bays v. Shenango Co.12 relied on
Pennsylvania case law, it is necessary to examine the labor dispute disqualification provisions of both Pennsylvania's'3 and Ohio's 44 unemployment compensation acts, as well as the two states' pertinent court
decisions regarding these provisions. The Pennsylvania and Ohio unemployment compensation acts are textually similar and historically, the
courts of these states have used similar methods to determine whether
idled employees are entitled to unemployment benefits."5 Indeed, the
Bays decision represents the most recent example of this proposition.
Further, both states' acts have similar purposes and goals. 46 Thus, an
examination of both states' unemployment statutes and their courts' decisions is helpful in understanding why the Bays court chose to adopt
Pennsylvania's "status quo" test, whether the Bays court should have
adopted the standard, and whether the Bays court applied that standard correctly.
1. Pennsylvania
Under section 802(d) of the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Law, 47 a claimant is ineligible for unemployment compensa-

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 53 Ohio St. 3d 132, 559 N.E.2d 740 (1990).
43. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 802(d) (Purdon 1964).
44. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.28(D)(1)(a).
45. Compare Leto Unemployment Compensation Case, 176 Pa. Super. 9, 106 A.2d 652
(1954) (applying final cause test to determine that a work stoppage was due to a lockout) and
Vrotney Unemployment Compensation Case, 400 Pa. 440, 163 A.2d 91 (1960) (creating status

quo test for determining whether work stoppages are due to lockouts or strikes) with Alden v.
United States Indus. Chems. Co., 9 Ohio App. 2d 5, 222 N.E.2d 785 (1966) (impliedly using final
cause test to determine that a work stoppage was due to a lockout) and Oriti v. Unemployment
Compensation Bd. of Review, 7 Ohio App. 3d 311, 455 N.E.2d 720 (1983) (adopting Vrotney
status quo test). For discussions of these cases, see infra notes 52-65, 85-91, 120-41 and accompa-

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/9
nying text.
46.
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See infra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
41 PA CONS STAT ANN 99 71;1-RRI (Prnn
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tion benefits during a work stoppage unless the work stoppage is the
result of a lockout. 48 The Pennsylvania statute, however, does not define the word "lockout." 4' 9 An early test adopted by the Pennsylvania
courts to determine whether a work stoppage was the result of a lockout was the "final cause" test.50 Under this test, the courts would imparty whose actions constituted the
pose responsibility or fault upon the
51
final cause of the work stoppage.
In Erie Forge and Steel Corp. v. Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review (Vrotney Unemployment Compensation Case), 52 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court replaced the "final cause" test with the
"status quo" test to assign fault for a work stoppage and, thus, to determine whether a work stoppage is due to a lockout or a strike.5 3 In
Vrotney, the union and management were engaged in negotiations
spanning over an extensive period.5 4 The union asked for increases in

48. Section 802(d) in pertinent part states: "An employee shall be ineligible for compensation for any week. . . (d)[i]n which his unemployment is due to a stoppage of work, which exists
because of a labor dispute (other than a lock-out) at the factory, establishment or other premises
" 43 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 802 (D) (PURDON 1964).
at which he is or was last employed ....
-49. The Pennsylvania courts have defined a lockout as "an employer's withholding of work
from his employees in order to gain a concession from them." Small Tube Products, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review (Irvin Unemployment Compensation Case), 198 Pa.
Super. 308, 314-15, 181 A.2d 854, 858 (1962). Moreover, it has been identified as "the employer's
counterpart of a strike." Id. A strike has been defined as "the act of quitting work done by mutual
understanding by a body of workmen as a means of enforcing compliance with demands made on
their employer." Armour Leather Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Rev., 192 Pa.
Super. 190, 195, 159 A.2d 772, 775 (1960).
50. Note, Employees May Collect Compensation During Contract Negotiations if Employer Imposes Changes in Status Quo that Are Beneficial to Employees, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 473, 477
(1985).
51. See id. (citing Leto Unemployment Compensation Case, 176 Pa. Super. 9, 106 A.2d
652 (1954) (lockout occurred because employer's imposition of unilateral wage reductions during
period between expiration of prior contract and adoption of new contract, after union had offered
to continue working under prior contract terms, was final cause of the work stoppage); Hogan
Unemployment Compensation Case, 169 Pa. Super. 554, 83 A.2d 386 (1951) (strike rather than
lockout transpired because union members' refusal to work without a contract was final cause of
work stoppage)); see also Comment, Pennsylvania's Lockout Exception to the Labor Dispute
Disqualification from Benefits: Federal Challenges and Issues, 80 DICK. L. REV. 70, 74 (1975)
(citing Morris v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 169 Pa. Super. 564, 568, 83 A.2d
394, 397 (1951)).
For a discussion of the Ohio courts' use of the final cause test, see infra notes 85-97 and
accompanying text.
52. 400 Pa. 440, 163 A.2d 91 (1960) [hereinafter Vrotney].
53. Note, Pennsylvania Abandons Prior Application of the Reinstatement of Status Quo
Standard in Work Stoppages Caused by Labor Disputes, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 503, 511 (1987); see
Note, supra note 50, at 477.
54. Vrotney, 400 Pa. at 442, 163 A.2d at 92.
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wages and fringe benefits. 5 Management made a counter-offer involving smaller increases in wages and fringe benefits than the union desired.5 6 In addition, management's offer was contingent upon the abolition of premiums and tonnage systems.5 7 The union refused
management's offer and informed management that upon the expiration of the present collective bargaining agreement, under which both
parties were working, a strike would take place. 58
On the day that the existing agreement was due to expire, the
union offered to continue working under the terms of the existing
agreement for an indefinite period with a five day cancellation clause
by either party to allow for additional time during which to continue
negotiations.5 9 Management refused the union's offer to extend the existing agreement and informed the union that future- employment
would only be available under the terms of management's final proposal."0 The union again refused to accept management's proposal, and
the employees continued to work until the agreement expired."' Following expiration of the agreement, the employer made employment avail62
able, but only under its new conditions.
For the purpose of determining whether the employees were entitled to unemployment benefits, the court placed responsibility for the
work stoppage on the party who failed to continue the working relationship for a reasonable period under the terms of the previous agreement
while negotiations for a new agreement continued.6 3 Thus, the employees were eligible to receive unemployment benefits due to management's rejection of the union's good faith offer to maintain the status
quo for a reasonable period.6 4 The Vrotney court's rationale for adopt-

55. Id.
56. Id. at 443, 163 A.2d at 93.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 444-45, 163 A.2d at 93-94. The Vrotney court stated the test of responsibility for
a work stoppage as follows:
Have the employees offered to continue working for a reasonable time under the pre-existing terms and conditions of employment so as to avert a work stoppage pending the final
settlement of the contract; and has the employer agreed to permit work to continue for a
reasonable time under the pre-existing terms and conditions of employment pending further negotiations? If the employer refuses to so extend the expiring contract and maintain
the status quo, then the resulting work stoppage constitutes a "lock-out" and the disqualification for unemployment compensation benefits in the case of a "stoppage of work because
of a labor dispute" does not qualify.
Id.
64. Id., 163 A.2d at 94.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/9
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ing the status quo standard was based upon the need for parties to
engage in the sensitive negotiating process in good faith and with the
65
common purpose of continuing the employment relationship.
Following the Vrotney decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has clarified the status quo test. In Philco Corporation v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,6 6 the court modified the status
quo test by holding that when a work stoppage assumes the form of a
strike, the burden is upon the employees to show that they either offered to maintain the status quo or that it would have been useless to
do so.67 In Philco, a collective bargaining agreement between the union
and management was due to expire on Saturday, April 25, 1964.8 The
union and management had engaged in excess of twenty" bargaining
sessions which failed to yield any significant concessions. 9 In response
to management's hard bargaining line, which the union perceived as a
"no contract-no work" position, the union voted to stop working on
April 27.70 At no time did the union offer to maintain the status quo."
Although management also failed to offer a continuation of the terms
of the pre-existing agreement, several management representatives testified that work was available on April 27.72
Based on these facts, the court concluded that as of April 25, the
union may have been justified in believing that management would not
open its doors without a new contract on the morning of April 27.7 a
The union was not justified, however, in voting to strike thirty-six hours
before management's actual decision to open or close on April 27."'
According to the court, the union foreclosed all possibility for a last
minute concession by voting to strike in advance. 75 Because the union
failed to advance an offer to maintain the status quo, the court determined that the work stoppage was due to a strike. 6
65. Id. at 443-44, 163 A.2d at 93. For a quotation of the courts' rationale in Vrotney, see
infra note 122 and accompanying text.
66. 430 Pa. 101, 242 A.2d 454 (1968).
67. Id. at 104, 242 A.2d at 455-56. The notion that employees need not prove that they
offered to maintain the status quo if it would have been useless to do so is known as the "futility
doctrine." Id., 242 A.2d at 456 (citing Irvin Unemployment Compensation Case, 198 Pa. Super.
308, 181 A.2d 854 (1962) (union need not offer to maintain status quo if it appears that management would definitely not accept offer)).
68. Id. at 107, 242 A.2d at 456.
69. Id., 242 A.2d at 457.
70. Id. at 107-08, 242 A.2d at 457.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 109, 242 A.2d at 458.
74. Id. at 110, 242 A.2d at 458-59.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 103-04, 242 A.2d at 455-56. As stated, there never was an offer to maintain the
status quo in Philco and the court scrutinized the period between the expiration of the contract
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While the Pennsylvania courts will scrutinize the actions of the
parties after an agreement expires, the courts refuse to consider the
subjective motivations for work stoppages. 7 Moreover, even the slightest departure from the extended contract terms represents an alteration
of the status quo.7 8 Indeed, Pennsylvania decisions demonstrate a reluctance to depart from the objectivity of the Vrotney test which fosters
predictability and clarity in determining who is at fault when a work
stoppage occurs, 79 and further encourages continued employment dur-

ing contract negotiations.80
2. Ohio

Akin to the labor dispute disqualification provision contained in
the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Law, 81 individuals in

and the actual work stoppage, determining that the union's actions foreclosed any opportunity for
last minute negotiations and concessions. Pennsylvania courts have been equally concerned with
situations in which there has been an offer to maintain the status quo and contract negotiations
continue. In these cases, the question is who first rejects that offer. See, e.g., Borello v. Unemploy-'
ment Compensation Bd. of Review, 490 Pa. 607, 613, 417 A.2d 205, 208-09 (1980) (practical
approach to Viotney test is determination of which party first refused working conditions of previous contract); Philco 430 Pa. at 103, 242 A.2d at 455 (test requires determination of which side
first refused to maintain operations under the status quo after expiration of contract, but while
negotiations continued).
77. E.g., Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review v. Sun Oil Co., 476 Pa. 589, 595,
383 A.2d 519, 522 (1978). See also Bokosky Unemployment Compensation Case, 206 Pa. Super.
96, 105, 211 A.2d 124, 128 (1965) (refusing to consider factors such as employer's profitability
and economic difficulties in determining whether work stoppage constituted a strike or a lockout).
In Local 730 v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 505 Pa. 480, 480 A.2d 1000
(1984), the court maintained its view on subjective factors. In Local 730, the employer's unilateral
change in the status quo effected an increase in wages and fringe benefits. Id. at 485-86, 480 A.2d
at 1003. The employer argued that because the new terms were more beneficial to the employees
than the terms of the previous agreement, his actions should not have been considered an alteration of the status quo. Id. The court disagreed, arguing that the determination of what might be
beneficial is an arduous task, and held that an alteration of the status quo need not necessarily'
result in a detriment to the other party. Id. at 486-87, 480 A.2d at 1003-b4. According to the
court, any examination of the subjective motivations for a work stoppage weakens the objectivity
of the Vrotney test. Id. at 489-90, 480 A.2d at 1005.
78. Chichester School District v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 53 Pa.
Commw. 74, 77-78, 415 A.2d 997, 1000 (1980) (work stoppage constitutes lockout even though
employer makes work available under substantially the same terms and conditions of the expired
contract).
79. Local 730, 505 Pa. at 489-90, 480 A.2d at 1005. "(S]ubjective motivations for a work
stoppage . . . undermine the clarity and relative predictability embodied in the standard set forth
in our Vrotney and Philco Corp. decisions." Id. (quoting Unemployment Compensation Bd. v. Sun
Oil, 476 Pa. 589, 595, 383 A.2d 519, 522).
80. See, e.g., Fairview School Dist. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 499 Pa.
539, 546-47, 454 A.2d 517, 521 (1982) (underlying rationale of status quo test is that employer
may continue operations and employees may continue working during the interim period); Sun
Oil, 476 Pa. at 594, 383 A.2d at 522 (Vrotney standard tends to encourage employers and employees to maintain the status quo while negotiating).
81. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 802(d) (Purdon 1964). See supra note 48 for a recitation of
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/9
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Ohio are ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits under section 4141.29(D)(1)(a) of the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Act
(the Act)82 unless their unemployment has resulted from a lockout.8 3
Similarly, the Act does not define the term "lockout." 8 4 In Alden v.
United States Industrial Chemicals Co.,8 5 the court of appeals impliedly used the final cause test to determine whether a work stoppage
was the result of a lockout. 86 In Alden, the court held that a lockout

82. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4141.01-.99 (Anderson 1991).
83. Section 4141.29(D), in pertinent part, states that:
[N]o individual may serve a waiting period or be paid benefits under the following
conditions:
(1) For any week with respect to which the administrator finds that:
(a) His unemployment was due to a labor dispute other than a lockout at any factory,
establishment, or other premises located in this state or any other state and owned or operated by the employer by which he is or was last employed; and for so long as his unemployment is due to such labor dispute.
Id. § 4141.29(D)(1)(a).
Ohio's and Pennsylvania's express exception to the disqualification of unemployment compensation benefits for employees who have been "locked out" represents a minority view. The following list represents other states' statutes that expressly allow individuals who are unemployed because of a lockout to receive unemployment compensation benefits: ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-1058(a) (1987); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-73-109(1) (West 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31236(a)(3) (West 1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 341.360(1) (Baldwin 1990); MD. ANN. CODE art.
95A, § 6(E) (1990); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 421.29(8) (West 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
268.09(3)(c)(2) (West 1983); MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-5-513(A)(4).(a) (Supp. 1991); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 282-A:36(II-a) (1987). For a collection of cases which interpret the statutory sections in the preceding list, see generally, Annotation, Unemployment Compensation:Application
of Labor Dispute for Benefits to Locked Out Employees, 62 A.L.R.3d 437 (1975 & Supp. 1991).
84. The Ohio courts have defined a lockout as a "cessation of. the furnishing of work to
employees or a withholding of work from them in an effort to get for the employer more desirable
terms." Zanesville Rapid Transit, Inc. v. Bailey, 168 Ohio St. 351, 354, 155 N.E.2d 202, 205
(1958) (citing Iron Moulders' Union No. 125 v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 F. 45, 52 (7th Cir.
1908)). A lockout is not necessarily confined to the "actual physical closing of the place of employment." Id. (citing Barnes v. Hall, 285 Ky. 160, 146 S.W.2d 929). Just as in Pennsylvania, the
strike is viewed as a lockout's counterpart; the strike has been defined as the cessation of work by
employees in an effort to obtain more desirable terms or working conditions. United States Coal
Co. v. Ohio Bd. of Review, 16 Ohio Op. 323, 329 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1939). Encompassing
both the lockout and the strike is the labor dispute which broadly covers any "controversy between
employer and employees concerning wages, working conditions or terms of employment." Leach v.
Republic Steel Corp., 176 Ohio St. 221, 223-24, 199 N.E.2d 3, 5 (1964). Thus, the labor dispute
includes both the strike and the lockout within its definition. Shadur, Unemployment Benefits and
the "Labor Dispute" Disqualification, 17 U: CHI. L. REV. 294, 300 (1950) (" 'strikes' and 'lockouts' are species within the genus 'labor dispute' "); see Bays v. Shenango Co., 53 Ohio St. 3d
132, 133, 559 N.E.2d 740, 742 (1990); Korbee, Labor.Disputesand the Right to Unemployment
Compensation in Ohio, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 823, 823-24 (1977).
85. 9 Ohio App. 2d 5, 222 N.E.2d 785 (1966).
86. See Korbee, supra note 84, at 827. The final cause test, also known as the "proximate
cause" test or the "last final act" test, is a "quasi-tort test of causation [used] to fix responsibility
for the work stoppage against the party whose actions constitute its final cause." Id. As previously
stated, the Pennsylvania courts used the final cause test as .ameans for determining whether a
claimant's unemployment was the result of a lockout. For a discussion of the final cause test used
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had occurred when a collective bargaining agreement expired and the
employer's supervisory personnel refused to allow members of a bargaining unit to work, even though they were capable of working and
were entirely willing to do so.87 In Alden, virtually any shut-down of
the employer's business, due to its nature, would have translated into
extreme financial hardship. 8 Furthermore, in the event of a work stoppage, it would have taken several days for the employer to transfer
replacement workers from other worksites1 9 Although the union agreed
to continue working on a day-to-day basis, the employer demanded that
the union provide a three-day notification before any termination of the
extension. 90 The union refused to agree to such terms, and at the expiration of the agreement, the employer made work unavailable to the
employees' union representatives. 9 1
The final cause test was also used in Zura v. Standard Slag
Corp.9" In Zura, the corporation feared that its employees would strike
following the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. 93 The
corporation believed that if its plant were left open, serious financial
harm would occur.0 4 Moreover, the corporation feared the creation of a
dangerous situation.9 5 When the agreement expired, the corporation
closed its plant.9 6 Based on these facts, the court held that the corporation's act of shutting-down the plant constituted a lockout.97
In Zanesville Rapid Transit, Inc. v. Bailey,98 the Ohio Supreme
Court also determined that a "reasonableness" standard must be applied in order to decide whether a work stoppage constitutes a lockout.9 9 The court stated that a lockout exists when an employer offers
terms for further employment which employees cannot reasonably be
expected to accept so that, in essence, the employees have no alternative but to leave their employment."0 ' In Zanesville, the employer had
determined that due to its unhealthy financial condition, it would be

in Pennsylvania, see supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
87. Alden, 9 Ohio App. 2d at 5-6, 222 N.E.2d at 785.
88. Id. at 6, 222 N.E.2d at 785.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 7, 222 N.E.2d at 786.
91. Id.
92. 13 Ohio Misc. 317, 224 N.E.2d 176 (1965).
93. Id. at 317, 224 N.E.2d at 177.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id., 224 N.E.2d at 176.
98. 168 Ohio.St. 351, 155 N.E.2d 202 (1958).
99. Id. at 355, 155 N.E.2d at 206.
100. Id. at 354-55, 155 N.E.2d 205-06 (citing Alamada v. Administrator, Unemployment
Compensation Act, 137 Conn. 380, 389-91, 77 A.2d 765, 771 (1951)).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/9
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unable to continue paying the same wages in a future contract. 1"' For
two and one-half months prior to the expiration of the contract, the
union was aware of the employer's financial woes and of the employer's
intention to cut wages by ten percent. 10 2 Furthermore, the employer, a
public utility, was unable to pass its costs along to its customers and
depended upon the city council in negotiating a franchise in order to
operate its business.' 03 Under these facts, the court held that there was
no lockout because the employer's offer to cut wages was not unreasonable under the circumstances and "did not manifest a purpose on the
.part of the company to coerce" the union into accepting more favorable
terms for the employer. 104
In Baker v. Powhatan Mining Co.,' 0 8 the Ohio Supreme Court apparently endorsed a "status quo" test when it held that a union had
engaged in a strike 0 6 when it refused to accept a contract extension
unless the company agreed to apply retroactively the negotiated terms
of a future agreement. 1 7 In Baker, a two-year collective bargaining
agreement between the company and the union was scheduled to expire
on March 31, 1941.10' Prior to the agreement's expiration, the two parties engaged in negotiations in order to form a new agreement. 0 9 The
union and the company submitted various proposals which failed to
bring about a new agreement. 1 0 Throughout the period prior to the
expiration of the then existing agreement, the company demonstrated
its willingness to extend the terms of that agreement beyond the date of
its expiration, until the adoption of a new agreement."' The union,
however, refused to continue working under the terms of the agreement
beyond its expiration unless the company agreed to apply retroactively

101.

Id. at 355, 155 N.E.2d at 206.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 355-56, 155 N.E.2d at 206.
105. 146 Ohio St. 600, 67 N.E.2d 714 (1946).
106. The Baker case occurred prior to the adoption of the present labor dispute disqualification provision which uses the term "lockout." In Baker, the court was confronted with construing
the meaning of the term "strike" as used in Section 1345-6(c) of the General Code. Section 13456(c) of the General Code read in pertinent part:
No benefits shall be payable to any individual who has lost his employment or has left his
employment by reason of a strike in the establishment in which he was employed, as long
as such strike continues; . . . or who refuses to accept an offer of work for which he is.
reasonably fitted.
Baker, 146 Ohio St. at 604, 67 N.E.2d at 717; see also United States Coal Co. v. Ohio Bd. of
Review, 16 Ohio Op. 323, 327 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1939).
107. Baker, 146 Ohio St. at 614-16, 67 N.E.2d at 721-22.
108. Id. at 602, 67 N.E.2d at 716.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 603, 67 N.E.2d at 716.
111. Id., 67 N.E.2d at 717.
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the terms of a future agreement. " ' On the next working day following
the expiration of the agreement, the employees failed to report for
work.' Notices were posted several days prior to the agreement's expiration informing the employees that work would be available after
March 31, and indeed, the company made work available under the
terms of the pre-existing agreement subsequent to the expiration of the
agreement."'
In concluding that the employees had engaged in a strike, the
Baker court quoted extensively from Sandoval v. Industrial Commission," 5 a Colorado Supreme Court decision which involved facts nearly
identical to the facts in Baker."" In Sandoval, the court held that employees had engaged in a strike where the employer made work available to its employees under the terms of a pre-existing agreement. for the
interim period following that agreement and where the employees refused to continue working under the expired agreement's terms unless
the status quo was modified." 7 The Baker court directly applied the
reasoning of the Sandoval court; and although the Baker court did not
expressly use the term "status quo," the court impliedly accepted the
concept of status quo" 8 by stating: "claimants at all times had the opportunity to continue or resume employment at the very same work
previously performed by them under the same terms and conditions
which had prevailed for two years."'' 9
In Oriti v. Board of Review,'" the Cuyahoga County Court of
Appeals expressly adopted the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's formulation of the status quo test in Vrotney Unemployment Compensation
Case,"' as well as the Vrotney court's rationale for the test, in order to

112. Id., 67 N.E.2d at 716-17.
113. Id., 67 N.E.2d at 716.
114. Id. at 603-04, 67 N.E.2d at 717.
115. 110 Colo. 108, 130 P.2d 930 (1942).
116. Baker, 146 Ohio St. at 614-16, 67 N.E.2d at 721-22. As in Baker, the parties involved
in Sandoval were the United Mine Workers of America and a coal company. Baker, 146 Ohio St.
at 602-03, 67 N.E.2d at 716; Sandoval, 110 Colo. at 111, 130 P.2d at 932. The parties were also
working under a contract which was due to expire on March 31, 1941. Sandoval. 110 Colo. at
111, 130 P.2d at 932. Throughout the period prior to the expiration of the agreement, the company demonstrated that employment would be available beyond the expiration of that agreement,
under that agreement's terms. Id. The union, however, refused to allow the employees to continue
working without a new agreement. Id.
117. Sandoval, 110 Colo. at 117, 121-22, 130 P.2d at 934, 936-37.
118. Oriti v. Bd. of Review, 7 Ohio App. 3d 311, 314, 455 N.E.2d 720, 724 (1983) (Baker
decision marks the adoption of the status quo principle for determining when a work stoppage
constitutes a strike).
119. Baker, 146 Ohio St. at 617, 67 N.E.2d at 722.
120. 7 Ohio App. 3d 311, 455 N.E.2d 720 (1983).
121. 400 Pa. 440, 163 A.2d 91 (1960). See supra notes 52-65 and accompanying text.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/9
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determine when a work stoppage constitutes a lockout.12 2 In Oriti, a
collective bargaining agreement between management and the union
was scheduled to expire on October 31, 1979.123 Negotiations for a new
contract were conducted throughout the latter months of 1979.124 On
October 30, the union withdrew all of its demands concerning non-economic issues.1 2 5 On October 31, management submitted its final offer,
which included both economic and non-economic issues and demanded
the acceptance of its entire proposal in order for there to be a new
agreement. 126 The union rejected management's proposal and the
1 27
agreement expired.
Following the union's rejection of management's proposal, but
prior to the actual expiration of the agreement, the chief union negotiator asked the chief management negotiator to extend the terms of the
then existing agreement. 2 8 The chief management negotiator refused
to agree to an extension of those terms, and when asked under what
terms the employees could work in the interim, the chief management
negotiator failed to respond.12 9 No communication was ever made to
the employees regarding terms and conditions for interim employment,

122. Oriti, 7 Ohio App. 3d at 312-13, 455 N.E.2d at 722-23. In adopting the status-quo
test, the court in Oriti recited the following passage from Vrotney:
In the very delicate and sensitive negotiations which are involved in the development of a
new collective bargaining agreement to replace one that is nearing its expiration, all parties
must be sincere in their desire to maintain the continued operation of the employer's enterprise. The law contemplates that collective bargaining will be conducted in good faith, with
a sincere purpose to find a basis for agreement. Neither an adamant attitude of 'no contract, no work' on the part of the employees, nor an ultimatum laid down by the employer
that work will be available only on his (employer's) terms, are serious manifestations of a
desire to continue the operation of the enterprise. While either or both of these positions
may legitimately be taken by the parties during the bargaining negotiations prior to the
expiration of the existing contract, when the contract has in fact expired and a new agreement has not yet been negotiated, the sole test . . . of whether the work stoppage is the
responsibility of the employer or the employees is reduced to the following: Have the employees offered to continue working for a reasonable time under the pre-existing terms and
conditions of employment so as to avert a work stoppage pending the final settlement of the
contract negotiations; and has the employer agreed to permit work to continue for a reasonable time inder the pre-existing terms and conditions of employment pending further negotiations? If the employer refuses to so extend the expiring contract and maintain the status
quo, then the resulting work stoppage constitutes a 'lockout' and the disqualification for
unemployment compensation benefits in the case of a 'stoppage of work because of a labor
dispute' does not apply.
Id. (quoting Vrotney, 400 Pa. at 443-45, 163 A.2d at 93-94).
123. Id. at 311, 455 N.E.2d at 721.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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so the employees ceased to work.13 0 Under these facts, the court held
that the employer's failure to extend the terms of the expired agree1 31
ment constituted a compensable lockout.

130. Id. The only communication that management sent to the union was a letter dated
November 7, 1979, in which management stated that it was unwilling to continue operation under
the terms and conditions of the expired agreement, but that the plant remained open for the
purpose of conducting meaningful negotiations. Id. at 311-12, 455 N.E.2d at 722.
131. Id. at 311, 455 N.E.2d at 720. In adopting the status quo test, the Oriti court held:
[W]here employees offer to continue working under the terms of a pre-existing collective
bargaining agreement pending final settlement of a labor dispute, the failure of the employer to accept such an offer constitutes a lockout unless it is demonstrated that the employer has a compelling reason for failing to so agree such that the extension of the contract be unreasonable under the circumstances.
A decision as to whether a lockout has occurred must be made with this standard in
mind.
Id. at 314, 455 N.E.2d at 724.
At first glance, the court in Oriti appears to have added a subjective element to the status quo
test by stating that it is not improper for an employer to refuse to extend the status quo if the
employer demonstrates that it has a compelling reason for its actions, and so long as an extension
of the status quo would be unreasonable under the circumstances. As stated earlier, however, the
Pennsylvania courts will not assess an employer's justifications for altering the status quo. See
Bokosky Unemployment Compensation Case, 206 Pa. Super. 96, 105, 211 A.2d 124, 128 (1965)
(refusing to consider factors such as employer's profitability and economic difficulties in determining whether work stoppage was a strike or a lockout); supra note 77 and accompanying text.
Indeed, the status quo test used in Pennsylvania does not tolerate judicial assessment of subjective
motivations upon which a work stoppage may be based. See Unemployment Compensation Bd. of
Review. v. Sun Oil Co., 476 Pa. 589, 595, 383 A.2d 519, 522 (1978) (refusing to entertain motivational reasons for work stoppage and maintaining status quo test's objectivity and certainty); see
supra note 77 and accompanying text. A closer examination of Pennsylvania case law, however,
shows that the Oriti holding may be harmonized with Pennsylvania holdings on the issue of subjective motivations under the Vrotney test. Oriti relied on a Pennsylvania case which held that, in
the course of negotiations, if an employer claims that it is unreasonable to maintain the status quo
because a plant requires closing or because work can only continue under modified conditions, and
it is demonstrated that an alteration in the status quo is necessary for the continued operation of
the employer's business, then the status quo need not be maintained. Oriti, 7 Ohio App. at 314,
455 N.E.2d at 723 (citing Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review v. Sun Oil Co, 19 Pa.
Commw. 447, 338 A.2d 710 (1975), aff'd, 476 Pa. 589, 383 A.2d 519 (1978)). Such a holding is
derived from the fact that the Vrotney test involves some subjectiveness in that the test requires
an assessment of whether the employees have "offered to continue working for a reasonable time
under the pre-existing terms and conditions of the employment." Vrotney, 400 Pa. at 444, 163
A.2d at 93; see supra note 63 and accompanying text. It is true that the Pennsylvania courts have
demonstrated their unwillingness to weigh the amount of economic harm an employer is, or will
be, suffering in determining whether a work stoppage is due to a lockout. E.g., Bokosky, 206 Pa.
Super. at 105, 211 A.2d at 128. The Pennsylvania courts, however, will use the "reasonable time"
clause of the Vrotney test to find that an employer's breach of the status quo may be justified
depending upon the nature of the employer's business. E.g., Hershey Estates v. Unemployment
Compensation Bd. of Review (Lerch Unemployment Compensation Case), 400 Pa. 446, 451, 163
A.2d 535, 537 (1960) (union's offer to continue working under pre-existing terms of collective
bargaining agreement on day-to-day basis was not an offer to extend the status quo for a reasonable time where employment consisted of service industries such as hotel, laundry, department
store, community inn, etc., thereby justifying employer's refusal to extend the terms of pre-existing agreement); see also Hoffman v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 524 Pa. 470,
480-81, 574 A.2d 57, 62 (1990) (approving Hershey court's examination into nature of employer's
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/9
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Prior to applying the Vrotney test to the facts in Oriti, the court
surveyed Ohio case law addressing the state's labor dispute disqualification provision and concluded that Ohio case law is entirely consistent
with the reasoning in Vrotney. 32 Looking first to Baker,13' the Oriti
court determined that, in essence, the status quo principle had already
been adopted for determining when a work stoppage may be regarded
as a strike. 1 " Next, the court cited Alden'3 5 and Zura'3 6 as support
for the proposition that the status quo principle should also be applied
to determine whether work stoppages are to be considered lockouts.137
Moreover, the court stated that the principle of status quo was consistent with the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Zanesville,' but
under the facts of that case there was no lockout because an extension
of the prior contract terms for any period would have been unreasonable. 1 39 As for Zanesville's use of the "reasonableness" standard, the
Oriti court stated that the status quo test provides a "bright line" standard whereby "the refusal to maintain the status quo is presumptively
unreasonable."' 4 " Thus, by blending together nearly fifty years of Ohio
case law, the Oriti court concluded that an adoption of the Vrotney
status quo test, for use in determining when a work stoppage is a lockout, is sound and fully comports with Ohio precedent regarding the
issue."'

III.

FACTS AND HOLDING

On October 1, 1982, a collective bargaining agreement went into
effect between the Shenango Company (Shenango), at its Dover Plant,

business in order to determine whether lockout had occurred).
Thus, the Oriti court was correct in noting that in Pennsylvania, a compelling reason may
justify an employer's decision against extending the status quo, or may justify its decision to terminate the status quo at some point during extended negotiations. The Oriti holding, therefore, is
best viewed as a maintenance of the Vrotney test's refusal to account for subjective motivations in
determining whether work stoppages are due to lockouts, and should not be viewed as adding
subjective elements to the predominantly objective test.
132. Oriti, 7 Ohio App. at 313-14, 455 N.E.2d at 723-24.
133. 146 Ohio St. 600, 67 N.E.2d 714 (1946). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes
105-19 and accompanying text.
134. 7 Ohio App. at 313-14, 455 N.E.2d at 723-24.
135. 9 Ohio App. 2d 5, 222 N.E.2d 785 (1966). For a discussion of this case, see supra
notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
136. 13 Ohio Misc. 317, 224 N.E.2d 176 (1965). For a discussion of this case, see supra
notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
137. Oriti, 7 Ohio App. 3d at 314, 455 N.E.2d at 724.
138. 168 Ohio St. 351, 155 N.E.2d 202 (1958). For a discussion of this case, see supra
notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
139. Oriti, 7 Ohio App. 3d at 314, 455 N.E.2d at 724.
140. Id.
Id. at 313, 455
N.E.2d at 723.
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and the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, Local Union
No. 6968 (the union).142 The three-year agreement was scheduled to
expire at midnight on September 30, 1985." 3 On September 27, the
union offered to extend the agreement as it then existed, for one year,
while negotiations continued.' 44 Rejecting the union's offer, Shenango
tendered a counter proposal in which Shenango offered the union a
choice: as of October 1, the employees could work at the Dover Plant
under the company's "term ending negotiations position" or, alternatively, could accept a thirty-day extension of the then-existing agreement.' 45 The latter alternative, however, failed to include a cost-of-living adjustment "roll-in" which had been negotiated in 1982 and was
due to take effect on September 30, 1985.146 The union refused to acthe
cept either of Shenango's proposals, and on October 1, following
41
expiration of the agreement, the employees stopped working.'
During October and November of 1985, the employees applied for
unemployment compensation benefits with the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services." 8 In December, the Administrator of the Ohio Bureau
of Employment Services determined that appellants were unemployed
due to a labor dispute other than a lockout at Shenango. 14 9 Pursuant to
Ohio Revised Code section 4141.29(D)(1)(a), 50 the Administrator denied the employees' applications for unemployment benefits.' 5'
The employees filed a request for reconsideration of the disallowance of unemployment compensation benefits.' 52 The request was directed to the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review. On January 23, 1987, the Board held a hearing regarding the request, and
affirmed the Administrator's decision denying unemployment compen53
sation benefits.'

142. Bays, 53 Ohio .St. 3d at 132, 559 N.E.2d at 741.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 132-33, 559 N.E.2d at 741.
146. Id. at 133, 559 N.E.2d at 741. According to the dissent, all of the cost-of-living adjustments, including the one scheduled to roll-in on September 30, 1985, were separately negotiated
terms which were to be added into the employees' standard hourly wages. See id. at 137, 559
N.E.2d at 745 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The cost-of-living adjustments were due to expire on September 30, 1985, the same day that the collective bargaining agreement itself was due to expire.
Id. at 139, 559 N.E.2d at 747 (Wright, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 133, 559 N.E.2d at 741.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.29(D)(1)(a) (Anderson 1991). For a recitation of section 4141.29(D)(1)(a), see supra note 83. For a general discussion of Ohio's Unemployment Compensation Act, see supra notes 8-41 and accompanying text.
151. 53 Ohio St. 3d. at 133, 559 N.E.2d at 741.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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On appeal, the Court of Common Pleas of Tuscarawas County reversed the Board of Review's denial of unemployment compensation

benefits. 15' In turn, the court of appeals reversed the common pleas
court's decision."' The court of appeals ruled that the trial court's
judgment was contrary to law because the Board of Review's decision
was neither unlawful nor against the manifest weight of the evidence.' 56 The case then came before the Ohio Supreme Court pursuant
to an allowance of a motion to certify the record. 57
In reversing the judgment of the court of appeals, the Bays court
specifically held that the union's offer to extend the pre-existing contract, including established cost-of-living adjustments, for one year, was
an offer to maintain the status quo."' Before rendering its holding, the
Ohio Supreme Court stated that Shenango's offer to extend the contract for thirty days, excluding the final cost-of-living adjustment due
to be rolled-in on September 30, 1985, was not an offer to maintain the
status quo. 159 In concluding that the union's offer represented an offer
to maintain the status quo, the court validated the Vrotney status quo
test which was previously adopted in Oriti v. Board of Review'6 ° by the
Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals.'
The Bays court began its analysis by surveying prior Ohio court
decisions which defined the terms "strike," "lockout," and "labor dispute."' 2 Implying that the concept of status quo had been adopted by
the Ohio Supreme Court in Baker v. Powhatan Mining Co.,' 63 the
court recited the "fully developed" Vrotney status quo test as enunciated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 64 The court then quoted the
154. Id. For a discussion concerning the appeal process under the Ohio Unemployment
Compensation Act, see supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
155. Bays, 53 Ohio St. 3d at 133, 559 N.E.2d at 741.
156. Id. For a discussion concerning the standard of review applied under Ohio's Unemployment Compensation Act, see supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
157. Bays, 53 Ohio St. 3d at 133, 559 N.E.2d at 741.
158. Id. at 136, 559 N.E.2d at 744.
159. Id. at 135, 559 N.E.2d at 743.
160. 7 Ohio App. 3d 311, 455 N.E.2d 720 (1983).
161. Bays, 53 Ohio St. 3d at 135, 559 N.E.2d at 743. This test was fully developed by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Erie Forge & Steel Corp. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of
Review (Vrotney Unemployment Compensation Case), 400 Pa. 440, 163 A.2d 91 (1960). To date,
Bays and Oriti are the only reported cases in which the Vrotney test has explicitly been used to
determine whether a work stoppage is a "lockout" under § 4141.29(D)(1)(a) of the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Act, thereby entitling idle workers to unemployment compensation benefits. For a recitation of the Vrotney test adopted in Oriti, see supra note 122.
162. Bays, 53 Ohio St. 3d at 133-34, 559 N.E.2d at 742. For definitions of these terms, see
supra note 84 and accompanying text.
163. 146 Ohio St. 600, 67 N.E.2d 714 (1946). See supra notes 105-19 and accompanying
text.
164. Bays, 53 Ohio St. 3d at 134-35, 559 N.E.2d at 742-43. The Bays court stated that the
status quo test was fully developed in the Vrotney Unemployment Compensation Case, 400 Pa.
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status quo standard incorporated in the holding of Oriti v. Board of
Review, 165 and noted that in order to assess whether a work stoppage
was the result of a lockout, there would have to be a prior determination of who - the employer or the union - first refused to continue employment under the status quo, following the agreement's expiration
but during continuing negotiations."' 6
To determine who first refused to continue employment, the Bays
court initially looked to Shenango's actions and determined that Shenango failed to maintain the status quo.16 7 Looking to the agreement
between Shenango and the union, the court noted that at the time of
negotiations, the most recent cost-of-living adjustment, made on July 1,
1985, was due to be paid to the employees, or "rolled-in," on September 30, 1985."68 Shenango's offer to extend the contract for thirty days,
however, excluded this last roll-in." 9 The court, therefore, found that
Shenango's offer constituted an alteration of the contract signed in
1982, and thus, could not be considered an offer to maintain the status
1 70
quo.
Next, the court looked to the union's actions. It noted that the
union offered to extend the contract for one year with the same formula
for determining cost-of-living adjustments. 71 Choosing not to discuss
whether a contract extension for a one-year period is reasonable, the
court simply held that "the offer by the union to work under a preexisting contract which included established cost-of-living adjustments
[was] an offer to maintain the status quo. ' '177 Justices Holmes and
Wright dissented vigorously in opinions with which Chief Justice
Moyer concurred. 1 73 Justices Holmes and Wright agreed that the status quo test is the correct test to.apply in order to determine whether a
work stoppage is a lockout.174 They felt, however, that the majority
misapplied and misinterpreted the test, and that the facts in Bays did

440, 443-45, 163 A.2d 91, 93-94 (1960). For an oration of this test, see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
165. 7 Ohio App. 3d 311, 314,455 N.E.2d 720, 724 (1983). The Oriti holding incorporated
the Vrotney status quo test. For a direct quotation of the Oriti holding, see supra note 131. For a
general discussion of the Oriti decision, see supra notes 120-41 and accompanying text.
166. Bays, 53 Ohio St. 3d at 135, 559 N.E.2d at 743 (quoting Philco Corp. v. Unemployment. Compensation Bd. of Review, 430 Pa. 101, 103, 242 A.2d 454, 455 (1968)).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 136, 559 N.E.2d at 744.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 136, 138, 559 N.E.2d at 744, 746 (Holmes and Wright, J.J., dissenting)
174. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/9
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not point to a lockout.175 Additionally, Justice Wright believed that the
majority acted beyond the scope of its authority by disturbing the

Board of Review's decision that the union failed to propose an extension of the agreement which satisfied the status quo test. 176

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Adoption of the Status Quo Standard in Ohio

In Bays v. Shenango Company,'" the majority and both dissenting opinions agreed that the status quo standard adopted by the court
of appeals in Oriti v. Board of Review 7 8 comports with Ohio case law
on the issue of whether a work stoppage is due to a strike or a lockout. 17 9 Based on the purpose of the Ohio Unemployment Compensation
Act, the outright adoption of a status quo standard is appropriate. Ohio
decisions have consistently stated that the unemployment act is
designed to alleviate the hardships of unemployment by providing financial assistance to those who are unemployed through no fault of
their own.' 80 This purpose is fortified by the legislature's express intent
175. Id. For a more thorough discussion of the issues upon which the dissents focused, see
infra notes 197-99, 215-19, 226-29, 240-45, 249-56 and accompanying text.
176. Id. at 141, 559 N.E.2d at 748. According to Justice Wright, there was evidence that
the union never communicated to Shenango that it sought a contract extension without quarterly
cost-of-living increases. Id. Justice Wright recited a portion of the testimony taken at trial in
which the president of the union was asked and stated the following:
Q. Well, lets - lets go through this again. What I want to find out, when you offered
the one year extension, was that with four cost-of-living increases over the period of that
one year per - that one year?
A. To the best of my knowledge, on the 20th we offered it that way, yes.
Q. Okay. Did you modify this offer at any time after that before the expiration of the
old contract?
A. On - when we discussed the contract extension on another occasion - I'm not sure
which date it was - we told them we would give them [a] one year extension for help in the
future, and at that time it was my feeling we were not talking about any cost-of-living,
cause we told 'em [sic] at that time we could not talk 30 and 20 percent reduction.
Q. When you say it was your feeling that you weren't talking about cost of living, did
you ever make it clear to the Company that the Union was willing to extend the contract
for a one year period without any further cost-of-living increases?
A. I don't believe that we ever got far enough to discuss that.
Id. (emphasis added by Justice Wright). Applying the standard of review set forth in §
4141.28(0) of the Ohio Revised Code, Justice Wright concluded that the trial court acted beyond
the scope of its authority and that the board's denial of unemployment compensation benefits
should have been reinstated. Id. For a discussion of the standard of review mandated by §
4141.28(0), see supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
177. 53 Ohio St. 3d 132, 559 N.E.2d 740 (1990).
178. 7 Ohio App. 3d 311, 455 N.E.2d 720 (1983).
179. See generally Bays, 53 Ohio St. 3d 132, 559 N.E.2d 740.
180. E.g., Irvine v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 19 Ohio St. 3d 15, 17, 482
N.E.2d 587, 589 (1985) (quoting Salzi v. Gibson Greeting Cards 61 Ohio St. 2d 35, 39, 399
N.E.2d 76, 79 (1980)) (" '[the] act was intended to provide financial assistance to an individual
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UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 16:3

that section 4141.29(D)(1)(a)' 8 ' be construed liberally. 8 2 By affirming
the status quo standard, which determines fault by placing responsibility for a work stoppage upon the party who has breached the status
quo, 18 3 the Bays court has allowed for a mechanism by which the Act's
overriding purpose may be effectuated. 8
In determining whether the status quo test is the proper mecha-

nism to further the purpose of Ohio's unemployment compensation
statue, it is helpful to examine Pennsylvania's approach to unemployment compensation because Pennsylvania's disqualification provision is

similar to Ohio's in both language and purpose.18 5 Unlike Ohio's unem-

ployment compensation statute which contains no declaration of public
policy, Pennsylvania's statute expressly provides unemployment compensation benefits for those who are unemployed through no fault of
their own.' 88 Indeed, this premise is deemed the central notion of the

who had worked, was able and willing to work, but was temporarily without employment through
no fault or agreement of his own.' "); United States Coal Co., v. Unemployment Compensation
Bd. of Review, 16 Ohio Op. 323, 327 (C.P. 1939), affid, 66 Ohio App. 329, 32 N.E.2d 736,
(1940) ("the broad intent and purpose of this act is to provide against the risks of unemployment
by granting security and compensation to those persons who become separated from their employment through no condition of their own creation .... ");see also Leach v. Republic Steel Corp.,
176 Ohio St. 221, 223, 199 N.E.2d 3, 5 (1964) ("The purpose of the act ... is to enable unfortunate employees, who become and remain involuntarily unemployed ...,to subsist on a reasona...
); Nowak v. Board of Review, 150 Ohio St. 535, 537-38, 83 N.E.2d 208,
bly decent level.
209 (1948) ("The purpose of this law is to assist those, who are unfortunate enough to be involuntarily unemployed. ...9).
181. OHIo REV.CODE ANN. § 4141.29(D)(l)(a) (Anderson 1991).
182. Id. § 4141.46 ("Sections 4141.01 to 4141.46, inclusive, of the Revised Code shall be
liberally construed.").
183. See Comment, supra note 51, at 73-75 (discussing arguments concerning Pennsylvania's fault-based disqualification provision and status quo test); see generally Lewis, The Lockout
Exception: A Study in Unemployment Insurance Law and Administrative Neutrality, 6 CAL. W.
L. REV. 89 (1969).
184. A discussion of the virtues and vices of fault based labor dispute disqualification provisions contained in unemployment compensation statutes such as Ohio's is beyond the scope of this
article. For a discussion of the various views regarding this topic, see Comment, supra note 51, at
73-75.
185. For a recitation of Pennsylvania's labor dispute disqualification provision, see supra
note 48.
186. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 752 (Purdon 1964). Section 752 is entitled "Declaration of
Public Policy" and reads in full:
Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals,
and welfare of the people of the Commonwealth. Involuntary unemployment and its resulting burden of indigency falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker, and ultimately upon the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions in the form of poor relief
assistance. Security against unemployment and the spread indigency can best be provided
by the systematic setting aside of financial reserves to be used as compensationfor loss of
wages by employees during periods when they become unemployed through no fault of
their own. The principle of the accumulation of financial reserves, the sharing of risks, and
the payment of compensation with respect to unemployment meets the need of protection
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/9
against the hazards of unemployment and indigency. The Legislature, therefore, declares
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Pennsylvania statute." 7 Furthermore, the language of Pennsylvania's
disqualification provision is substantially similar to Ohio's because they
both state that work stoppages resulting from lockouts do not disqualify
claimants from collecting unemployment compensation benefits. 188
Moreover, prior to the creation of the Vrotney status quo test, both
Pennsylvania and Ohio courts used the final cause test to determine
whether a lockout had occurred. 8 9 Thus, Pennsylvania and Ohio have
much in common with regard to the legal issue of disqualification of
unemployment compensation benefits when individuals become unemployed because of a labor dispute. Based on their similarly worded statutes which manifest analogous legislative purposes, 190 and court decisions which show the existence of common roots prior to the creation of
the status quo test, 1 ' it is reasonable for Ohio to adopt the status quo
test which Pennsylvania has been using and clarifying for over thirty
years. Indeed, all of the Justices who participated in the Bays decision
believe that the status quo test is. proper for Ohio. The crucial question,
therefore, is not whether status quo should be the standard used in
Ohio, but what exactly that standard envisions.
In examining the remaining issues in the Bays case and in'determining what the status quo standard envisions, it is logical that Pennsylvania precedent covering similar issues should control. The status
quo test was enunciated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1960
and has been consistently applied in unemployment compensation cases
involving work stoppages due to labor disputes. 9" The court of appeals
in Oriti adopted Pennsylvania's test.' 9 3 Furthermore, both the majority
that in its considered judgment the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of
this commonwealth require the exercise of the police powers of the Commonwealth in the
enactment of this act for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be
used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own.
Id. (emphasis added).
187. Miller v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 152 Pa. Super. 315, 321, 31
A.2d 740, 743 (1943). "The fundamental idea of the [Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation
Law] is to provide a reserve fund to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no
fault of their own." Id.
188. See supra notes 48 and 83 respectively for a recitation of Pennsylvania's and Ohio's
disqualification provisions.
189. For a discussion of Pennsylvania's use of the final cause test prior to its creation of the
status quo test, see supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. For the same discussion, but covering Ohio decisions, see supra notes 85-97 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 180, 186-87 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 45, 86 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., Miceli v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 519 Pa. 515, 520-21,
549 A.2d 113, 115 (1988) (noting that the Vrotney status quo test is well established and has been
consistently applied in unemployment compensation cases where a work stoppage has resulted
from a labor dispute.)
193. Bays, 53 Ohio St. 3d 133, 135, 559 N.E.2d 740, 743 (citing Oriti, 7 Ohio App. 3d 311,
455 N.E.2d 720).
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and the dissenting opinions in Bays supported their positions with
Pennsylvania case law. 194 Yet, the Bays court held differently than the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court on substantially similar issues. Although
one might expect that a decision breaking from relevant precedent
would be bolstered by justifications for such a deviation, the Bays court
departed from Pennsylvania precedent without clearly explaining why
it felt compelled to do so.
B. The Effect of Cost-of-Living Adjustments Under the Concept of
Status Quo
The majority in Bays held that an offer by the union to work
under the terms of the expired agreement for a reasonable period until
a new agreement could be negotiated necessarily needed to include all
of the prior agreement's terms in order to qualify as an offer to maintain the-status quo. 19 ' The majority, however, cited no authority for its
conclusion on this specific issue. 190 Justices Holmes and Wright, on the
other hand, felt that the majority misconstrued the concept of status
quo and believed that during the period following the expiration of the
agreement, the extension of that agreement should not have included
cost-of-living adjustments.19 7 Unlike the majority, Justices Holmes and

194. See generally id.
195. Id. at 136, 559 N.E.2d at 744. Such required terms included cost-of-living adjustments
implemented in accordance with the pay schedule contained in the expired agreement. Id.
196. There is authority for the notion that in order to maintain the status quo during a
contract hiatus, an employer must continue to pay periodic adjustments as envisioned by the expired contract. In fact, this is considered the majority view. This view, however, has been espoused
in labor disputes concerning labor law issues, adjudicated under state and federal labor relations
acts, and not generally in the context of unemployment compensation disputes. See Befort, Public
Sector Bargaining:Fiscal Crisis and UnilateralChange, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1221, 1268-71 (1985)
(examining treatment of status quo in the public and private sectors within the context of labor
law); see also Vienna School District No. 55 v. Illinois Educ. Labor Relations Board, 162 Ill.
App. 3d 503, 507-09, 515 N.E.2d 476, 479-80 (1987) (discussing status cjuo under state labor law
act and holding that yearly salary increases furnished by school board were status quo); Galloway
Township Board of Educ. v. Galloway Township Educ. Assoc., 78 N.J. 25, 48-53, 393 A.2d 218,
230-32 (1978) (discussing effect of unilateral changes/disruptions of status quo under principles
of labor law, and concluding that New Jersey labor statute requires payment of annual step increments in accordance with prior contract during negotiations); Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Authority, 5 P.E.R.B. 3037, 3064-65 (N.Y. 1972) (holding that New York's labor statute requires
employer to maintain incremental salary adjustments during negotiations following expiration of
contract). But see Fairview School District v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Bd.
of Review, 499 Pa. 539, 547, 454 A.2d 517, 521 (1982) (holding that school district's refusal to
allow step up in pay during interim period following expiration of prior contract was not alteration
of status quo and that work stoppage resulted from strike for the purposes of unemployment
compensation).
For authority asserting the view that unemployment compensation law and labor law are two
distinct areas, and that principles of the latter should not be used to decide issues involving the
former, see infra note 224 and accompanying text.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/9
197. Bays, 53 Ohio St.3d at 137, 139-40, 559 N.E.2d at 745, 747 (Holmes and Wright,
J.J., dissenting).
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Wright pointed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision of
Fairview School District v. Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review 198 as direct support for their positions. 199
In Fairview, a collective bargaining agreement between the school
board and the teachers expired on August 26, 1979.00 The two parties
agreed that the teachers would continue working under the terms of the
expired agreement while negotiations for a new agreement took
place.2"' On September 7, the teachers received their regularly scheduled bi-weekly paychecks. 2 These paychecks were computed under
the same salary matrix contained in the expired agreement, but failed
to include a step-up in pay based on the teachers' additional year of
service, which would have been applicable under the terms of the old
agreement. 03
After filing a grievance, the teachers' union initiated a work stoppage and claimed that they had been locked out due to the school district's failure to implement pay increases in accordance with the extended agreement. 0 4 The Unemployment Security Office denied the
teachers unemployment benefits.2 0 5 The Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review granted benefits and the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court affirmed.2 0
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the school district argued that by paying the teachers the same salaries that were
paid to them in the last year of the expired contract, rather than stepping up their salaries for an additional year of service, the status quo
was not disrupted. 0 7 The school district reasoned that the salary schedules containing the salary increases in the expired contract were bargained for by the teachers and the school district only for the years
covered by the expired agreement and that they were never envisioned
to continue beyond those years. 08 Furthermore, the school district ar-

198. 499 Pa. 539, 454 A.2d 517 (1982).
199. Bays, 53 Ohio St. 3d at 137, 140, 559 N.E.2d at 745, 747 (Holmes and Wright, J.J.,
dissenting).
200. Fairview, 499 Pa. at 541, 454 A.2d at 518.
201. Id. at 541-42, 454 A.2d at 518.
202. Id. at 542, 454 A.2d at 518.
203. Id.
204. Id., 454 A.2d at 519.
205. Id.
206. Id. The Commonwealth Court held that a disruption of the status quo occurred when
the school district failed to step-up the teachers' salaries in accordance with the terms of the
expired agreement during the year in which negotiations for a new agreement were under way.
Thus, the teachers were eligible for unemployment benefits. Id. at 544, 454 A.2d at 520.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 544-45, 454 A.2d at 520.
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gued that payment of salary increases during the period in which a new
agreement was being negotiated would undermine the bargaining positions of the parties." 9
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court. agreed with the school district
that its failure to pay the teachers stepped up salaries did not
held
and
disrupt the status quo."' The court relied on cases from two other jurisdictions 21 1 which held that the status quo requires a freezing of the
2 In
pay rate during the interim period at the rate of the previous year.
doing so, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded:
The underlying rationale for the status quo requirement is that during the interim period between contracts, the employer may continue operations and the employee may continue working, while the parties are
free to negotiate on an equal basis in good faith. Maintenance of the
status quo is merely another way of stating that the parties must continue the existing relationship in effect at the expiration of the old contract. To require the School District to pay stepped up salary increases
beyond the specified years contained in the expired contract changes the
existing relationship in the context of the terms and conditions subject to
the very negotiations sought to be fostered."
The Fairview decision clearly demonstrates that in construing the
status quo test within the context of pay increases, the Pennsylvania
courts will find no disruption of the status quo when an employer fails
to pay increased wages during the interim period following the expiration of a previous collective bargaining agreement. Simply stated, employers will not be deemed to have locked out their employees when
they continue to pay the same wages that were paid during the final
year of the expired agreement. Hence, employees may not collect unemployment benefits under such circumstances.
The Ohio Supreme Court in Bays, however, came to the opposite

209. Id. at 545, 454 A.2d at 520.
210. Id., 454 A.2d at 521.
211. See M.S.A.D. No. 43 Teachers Assoc. v. M.S.A.D. No. 43 Bd. of Directors, 432 A.2d
395 (Me. 1981); Board of Coop. Educ. Servs. v. New York Pub. Employment Relations Bd.
(BOCES), 41 N.Y.2d 753, 395 N.Y.S.2d 439, 363 N.E.2d 1174 (1977). M.S.A.D. represents a
minority view of status quo, and the validity of the BOCES decision has been affected by the
subsequent passage of legislation in New York. For references discussing these cases and general
commentary on the issues contained therein, see Befort, supra note 196, at 1268-72; see generally
supra note 196.
212. Fairview, 499 Pa. at 545-47, 454 A.2d at 520-21. As representative of its view on
status quo, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court quoted the following passage: "'To say that the
status quo must be maintained during negotiations is one thing; to say that the status quo includes
a change and means automatic increases in salary is another.'" Id. at 546, 454 N.E.2d at 521
(citing Board of Coop. Educ. Servs., 41 N.Y.2d 753, 758, 395 N.Y.S.2d 439, 443, 3.63 N.E.2d
1174, 1177).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/9
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Because the court's decision clearly opposes Pennsylva-

nia's ruling on this issue, it appears that the Ohio Supreme Court,
while agreeing that status quo is a workable standard serving many
useful purposes under Ohio's Unemployment Compensation Act, has
consciously chosen not to adopt all of Pennsylvania's rulings on the various issues that have been analyzed under the status quo test.2 15 Without stating why Ohio is compelled to deviate from Pennsylvania's
course, especially when each Justice on the court fortified his or her
reasoning with Pennsylvania case law, the court has needlessly created
an air of uncertainty as to how future unemployment cases will be decided and, therefore, has invited future litigation.
The better view regarding the effect of cost-of-living adjustments
under the concept of status quo is that of Justices Holmes and Wright.
Justice Holmes believed that cost-of-living adjustment roll-ins are not
included in the concept of status quo."' He said that the roll-ins originally were negotiated terms to be added to the employees' wages, and
to continue the roll-ins during negotiations at the expiration of the
agreement would contravene the notion of status quo and would be
counterproductive to the entire negotiating process. 21 7
Like Justice Holmes, Justice Wright believed that an offer to
maintain cost-of-living adjustment roll-ins, in accordance with the
schedule contained in the expired contract, was not an offer to maintain
the status quo. 1 8 Justice Wright maintained that the cost-of-living adjustments, which amount to salary. increases, expired on the same date
as did the contract of employment and that they must be separately

214. Bays, 53 Ohio St. 3d at 136, 559 N.E.2d at 744.
215. This proposition presumes that the majority was aware of, and understood, the Pennsylvania case law that is directly on point on this issue. If this presumption is erroneous and the
majority meant to adopt Pennsylvania's rules of decision concerning status quo, or at least its rules
concerning the issue of pay increases under status quo, then the majority clearly held incorrectly.
216. Bays, 53 Ohio St. 3d 132, 137, 559 N.E.2d 740, 745 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (citing
Fairview, 499 Pa. 539, 454 A.2d 517).
217. Id. With regard to roll-ins, Justice Holmes stated:
Maintaining the status quo requires both parties to continue negotiations without demanding economic benefit in the interim. Allowing roll-ins would be counterproductive to these
tenuous labor negotiations. In a situation where the roll-ins are advantageous to the employees, and it is hard to imagine where this would not be the case, the allowance of roll-ins
would be a disincentive to settlement. This is especially true when these roll-ins are the
subject of ongoing negotiations.
As the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held in Fairview School Dist.,
"[t]o
require the School District to pay stepped up salary increases beyond the specified years
contained in the expired contract changes the existing relationship in the context of the
terms and conditions subject to the very negotiations sought to be fostered.
Id. (citations omitted) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (the case of Fairview School-Dist., was decided by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, not the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court).
218.
Id. at 139, 5591990
N.E.2d at 747 (Wright, J., dissenting).
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negotiated as part of wage bargaining.219 Justice Wright advised that
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding in Fairview should have
been applied in the present case. 22 0 He further argued that the court
should have found that the union's "offer of a one-year contract with
four cost-of-living increases obviously constituted an offer to enter a
new one-year contract" and therefore, the subsequent work stoppage
resulted from a strike.22 '
There are several justifications for adopting the dissenters' view
regarding cost-of-living adjustments under the concept of status quo.
Justices Holmes and Wright presented more persuasive arguments on
this issue because they presented relevant precedent from the jurisdiction which developed the test that Ohio adopted, whereas the majority
presented no precedent for its view on the issue.
Beyond this, however, the realities of the negotiating process point
to the conclusion that during the interim period between agreements,
wages should be frozen at the pre-existing agreement's rate. To allow
continued cost-of-living roll-ins during the contractual hiatus in effect
is to to extend the contract beyond its bargained-for term of years to
the detriment of the party who wishes to fairly do away with terms and
conditions which it views as oppressive. 222 Furthermore, the likelihood
that the satisfied party will truly bargain in good faith is seriously diminished. 2 3 It has been argued, of course, that the unemployment
compensation proceeding is not necessarily the place to adjudicate labor law issues such as good faith bargaining, 22 ' and that the first goal

219. Id. (Wright, J., dissenting). Justice Wright noted that appellants certainly had the
right to ask for such increases, but that such an offer may not be viewed as an extension of the
status quo. Id. at 139-40, 559 N.E.2d at 747 (Wright, J., dissenting).
220. Id. (Wright, J., dissenting).
221. Id. (Wright, J.,'dissenting).
-222. See generally Fairview, 499 Pa. 539, 454 A.2d 517.
223. Bays, 53 Ohio St. 3d at 137, 559 N.E.2d at 745 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
224. For example, an examination of Pennsylvania case law, demonstrates the view that
issues such as good faith bargaining should not necessarily be of concern to courts adjudicating
unemployment compensation cases. Justice Hutchinson, dissenting vigorously in Local 730 v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 505 Pa. 480, 499, 480 A.2d 1000, 1010 (1984), stated
that federal and state labor statutes were enacted to promote labor policies such as good faith
bargaining. He argued that the continual injection of labor law into unemployment compensation
cases has resulted in a disregard for the policy objectives which motivated Pennsylvania's legislature to pass the unemployment act in the first place. Id. Justice Hutchinson concluded his point by
stating:
The unemployment compensation proceeding is not the proper place in which to adjudicate
alleged violations of either state or federal labor law or to affirmatively promote policies
addressed by the statutes governing labor relations. See, e.g., D'Amato v. Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review, 196 Pa.Super. Ct. 76, 78, 173 A.2d 680, 682 (1961)
("It]he principle objective of the Unemployment Compensation Law is to alleviate economic distress in individual cases[;] . . . [t]he Law is not designed or intended to implement or to impede collective bargaining between unions and employers"); Carl Colteryahn
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/9
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of unemployment compensation, in Ohio and Pennsylvania, should be
to pay benefits to those who are unemployed due to no fault of their
own.22 There is no reason, however, to devise rules of law which conflict with other areas of the law when those conflicts need not persist.
Furthermore, the issue of fault may be seriously questioned when one
party insists upon continued cost-of-living adjustments during an interim period, though the specific period for which those terms were exclusively bargained has ended, and that party's insistence leads to a
labor dispute and work stoppage. 2 6 A rule that allows both parties to
continue operations under the pre-existing agreement, but allows
neither party to benefit through an extension of separately negotiated
terms that should have expired, avoids the harshness resulting from unemployment, injects certainty into findings of fault, and fosters good
faith negotiations during the interim period.
C. Extending the Expired Agreement for a Reasonable Period Under
the Concept of Status Quo
In Bays, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the union's proposal to
extend the expired agreement for one year was an offer to continue
working for a reasonable period, and therefore, represented an offer to
maintain the status quo. 2 7 Once again, however, the court provided no
support for its position. Moreover, the court failed to discuss what is
meant by the term "reasonable period." Rather, the court merely noted
that the union's offer to extend the agreement was for a one year period, yet included no discussion regarding the issue of what constitutes
a "reasonable period."
Justices Holmes and Wright maintained that an offer to extend
the contract for one year represented an unreasonable period, and that,
in fact, the offer was for a new contract. 28 Thus, they believed that the

Dairy, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 46 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
319, 326, 407 A.2d 71, 74 (1979) ("a compensation proceeding is not the place to adjudicate an alleged collective bargaining agreement violation or a claimed unfair labor
practice").
Id. at 499-500, 480 A.2d, 1010-11.
225. See supra notes 180-187 and accompanying text.
226. This assertion is not intended as a call for a more subjective approach in determining
whether unemployment compensation benefits should be given when a work stoppage results because of a labor dispute. Courts should maintain the objectiveness of the status quo test in deciding whether a work stoppage is due to a lockout. This assertion is simply intended as an attempt to
place the issue of cost-of-living adjustments within the confines of one's normal understanding of
the term "fault." By viewing the issue in this manner, it may be easier to understand exactly what
insisting upon continued cost-of-living adjustments means.
227. Bays, 53 Ohio St. 3d at 135-36, 559 N.E.2d at 744.
228.by Id.
at 136-40, 559
N.E.2d at 744-48 (Holmes and Wright, J.J., dissenting).
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union's offer was not one to preserve the status quo. 229 As with the
issue of cost-of-living adjustments, Justices Holmes and Wright supported their positions with Pennsylvania case law.
Both Justices relied on Bishop v. Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review 230 which was decided in the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court.23 1 In this case, a collective bargaining agreement between the union and the employer expired on May 31, 1983.232 Before
the expiration of the agreement, the union offered to continue working
under the terms of the existing agreement for a one year period. 3 3 The
employer desired a reduction in the pay scale and did not accept this
offer. 34 At no time during negotiations did either side offer to continue
working under the terms of the existing agreement for a period of less
than one year.23 5 Negotiations produced no new agreement and the
union commenced a work stoppage on June 1, 1983, the day after the
agreement expired, although work remained available on that date.236
At each level below the Commonwealth Court, the claimants were
denied unemployment benefits. 23 7 At these levels, the authorities determined that "one year is not a reasonable period . . . because it would
bind the Employer to the terms and conditions of the existing agreement, from which it was trying to escape, for a full year and the Union
would then have little or no incentive to bargain for that period. 2' 38
The Commonwealth Court agreed and stated further that the union's
offer was actually an offer for a new one-year agreement with the same
terms as the existing agreement, and as such, it did not represent an
2 39
offer to maintain the status quo during negotiations.
Courts in Pennsylvania have held.that union offers to continue preexisting agreements for periods of thirty, sixty, or ninety days, as well
as offers to work on a day-to-day basis, satisfy the reasonable period

229. Id.
230. 90 Pa. Commw. 553, 496 A.2d 110 (1985).
231. Bays, 53 Ohio St. 3d at 138-39, 559 N.E.2d at 745-47.
232. Bishop, 90 Pa. Commw. at 557, 496 A.2d at 112.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 559, 496 A.2d at 113.
239. Id.; see also Jehn v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 110 Pa. Commw.
209, 215-16, 532 A.2d 57, 59-60 (1987) (refusing to overturn Board's finding that union's offer to
return to work for one year period-was in fact an attempt to effect an end to negotiations by
means of a new one year contract); Hoffman v. Unemployment Compensation, Bd. of Review, 100
Pa. Commw. 264, 270, 514 A.2d 668, 671 (1986) ("Union's offer to resume work for a period of
one year was not an offer to continue the status quo pending negotiations; rather, it was an offer
for a new one year contract on the same terms and conditions as the prior contract."), rev'd on
other grounds, 524 Pa. 470, 574 A.2d 57 (1990).
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standard under the Vrotney status quo test.24 0 An overriding concern in
determining what constitutes a reasonable period is whether that period
creates an environment in which the parties will continue to negotiate
in good faith. 4 1 This is precisely the point that Justices Holmes and
Wright addressed. Justice Holmes stated that a one-year extension of
the contract is actually no extension at all, but instead is an offer of an
entirely new contract.2 42 According to Justice Holmes, a period of one
year would bind the employer to a fixed one-year contract which, under
243
other circumstances, the employer would never be willing accept.
Justice Holmes correctly stated that the Oriti standard requires an offer to continue working under the expired contract for a reasonable
period but that "the majority has betrayed the Oriti standard and has
substituted a new one in its place. "244
Justice Wright, in his dissent, also believed that an offer to extend
an expired contract for one year is an unreasonable period, and that in
essence, such an offer is tantamount to a new one-year contract. 245 According to Justice Wright, a one-year extension of the prior contract
would result in postponing the negotiating process rather than effectuating what he believed to be one of the purposes of status quo: to create
an environment suitable for good faith collective bargaining. 6

240. Hoffman. 524 Pa. at 484, 574 A.2d at 64; Orr v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of
Review, 120 Pa. Commw. 45, 52, 548 A.2d 360, 363 (1988) (citing Unemployment Compensation
Bd. of Review v. Sun Oil Co., 476 Pa. 589, 383 A.2d 519 (1978)).
241. See Hoffman, 524 Pa. at 484, 574 A.2d at 63-64; Orr, 120 Pa. Commw. at 365, 548
A.2d at 365 (citing Bedow v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 97 Pa. Commw. 192,
510 A.2d 152 (1986)); Jehn, 110 Pa. Commw. at 59, 532 A.2d at 59; Bishop, 90 Pa. Commw. at
559, 496 A.2d at 113.
242. Bays, 53 Ohio St. 3d at 138, 559 N.E.2d at 745 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 137, 559 N.E.2d at 745 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 137-38, 559 N.E.2d at 745 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Hypothesizing as to the
effect of the majority's ruling, Justice Holmes stated:
Henceforth . . .unions need only offer a one-year renewal of the current contract. If the
current contract is unacceptable to the employer, the employer is nevertheless forced to
accept this arbitrary one-year extension or be found to have locked out the employee without having offered or agreed to status quo in the interim. . . . The majority's holding will
have the effect of turning three-year contracts into four-year contracts if the union finds
this option more acceptable than what is being offered by the employer at the end of the
current contract. One must also wonder whether this arbitrary one-year extension is itself
renewable, thus binding the disadvantaged employer into the contract indefinitely.
Id.
245. Id. at 138-39, 559 N.E.2d at 746-47 (Wright, J., dissenting).
246. Id. Justice Wright found support for his views in Pennsylvania case law. Quoting
Vrotney, 400 Pa. 440, 444, 163 A.2d 91, 93 (1960), Justice Wright stated that the Vrotney court's
reason for "encouraging the parties to maintain the status quo once a contract has expired is 'that
collective bargaining will be conducted in good faith, with a sincere purpose to find a basis for
agreement.'" Bays. 530 Ohio St. 3d at 139, 559 N.E.2d at 746. Justice Wright also quoted from
Bishop, 90 Pa. Commw. at 559, 496 A.2d at 113, in which the court ruled that under the circumstances of that case, a one-year extension of the existing agreement represented an unreasonable
Published
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As with the issue of cost-of-living adjustments, Justices Holmes
and Wright provided the better reasoned arguments regarding the
"reasonable period" clause of the Vrotney status quo test, and their
views represent the correct path for Ohio. Yet, unlike the issue of costof-living adjustments, the majority not only failed to support its finding
that one year was a reasonable period for extending the status quo with
any precedent, but failed to discuss the issue altogether.
The same reasons supporting a finding that cost-of-living adjustments should not be included in the concept of status quo also support
a finding that one year, under the facts of Bays, does not represent a
reasonable period to extend the status quo. An offer to extend the status quo for a period as long as one year extends a contract beyond the
years for which it was bargained and, therefore, unfairly locks one of
the parties into oppressive terms and conditions. A finding that one
year is not a reasonable period also comports with the primary purpose
of Ohio's unemployment compensation statute2 4 because a party which
decides that it will continue to work under the status quo only for a
period of one year, and subsequently becomes unemployed because of a
labor dispute, cannot honestly be regarded as one who is unemployed
through no fault of his own. Had the party agreed to continue operations under the status quo for a significantly shorter period, leaving the
door open for good faith negotiations, then naturally it would be much
more difficult to find fault in that party's actions. Thus, a rule that
allows the parties to continue their operations until a new agreement
can be forged, but allows neither party to shackle the other to oppressive terms from which it would like to escape, avoids unemployment,
effectuates the primary purpose of the unemployment compensation
law, and fosters an environment of continued good faith negotiations.
D. Employer's Actions Under the Concept of Status Quo
In deciding which party was at fault for the work stoppage in
Bays, the Ohio Supreme Court scrutinized the actions of both the
union and Shenango.24 8 Before turning to the union's offer to extend
the status quo, the court analyzed Shenango's prior offer of continued
employment to the union and determined that it did not represent an
period. Bays, 53 Ohio St. 3d at 139, 559 N.E.2d at 746. (" 'one year is not a reasonable period
• . .because it would bind the Employer to the terms and conditions of the existing agreement,
from which it was trying to escape, for a full year and the Union would then have little or no
incentive to bargain for that period.' ").
For a discussion of the argument concerning whether issues of good faith bargaining should
not necessarily be of concern to courts which are adjudicating unemployment compensation cases,
see supra note 224 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
248. Bays, 53 Ohio St. 3d at 135, 559 N.E.2d at 743.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/9
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offer to maintain the status quo.24 9 The court ultimately
held that the
50

union's offer was one to maintain the status quo.1
In his dissent, Justice Wright criticized the majority for introducing Shenango's offer to the union into its analysis. 31 Justice Wright
argued that the Vrotney status quo test is not concerned with what the
employer offers to the employees, but only with whether the employees
have offered to maintain the status quo.2 52 Moreover, Justice Wright
asserted that such a rule is entirely consistent with Ohio's rule which
places the burden of proof in an unemployment compensation case
upon the party claiming unemployment compensation benefits.2 5
Pennsylvania precedent clearly supports Justice Wright's conclusion that the status quo test is only concerned with what the union
offers. As Justice Wright noted, the Vrotney test itself asks whether the
employees have offered, and whether the employer has agreed, to maintain the status quo for a reasonable time. 54 In addition, Justice Wright
quoted from Philco Corp. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review,2 55 in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that the

union must show it first-presented an offer to the employer to maintain
the status quo.2 56 Finally, as Justice Wright asserted, Ohio's burden of
proof in an unemployment compensation case is consistent with the allocation of the burden of proof in unemployment compensation cases in

Pennsylvania. 57
By emphasizing the employer's actions in Bays, the majority has
clouded the status quo test and has opened the door for examinations

249. Id.
.250. Id. at 136, 559 N.E.2d at 744.
251. Id. at 140, 559 N.E.2d at 747-48 (Wright, J., dissenting).
252. Id., 559 N.E.2d at 748 (Wright, J., dissenting) -(citing Vrotney Unemployment Compensation Case, 400 Pa. 440-44, 163 A.2d 91, 93 (1960)).
253. Id. (Wright, J., dissenting) (quoting Shannon v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 155 Ohio St. 53, 97 N.E.2d 425 (1951)).
254. Id., see also supra note 63 and accompanying text.
255. 430 Pa. 101, 242 A.2d 454 (1968). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 66-76
and accompanying text.
256. Bays, 53 Ohio St. 3d at 140, 559 N.E.2d at 748 (Wright, J., dissenting). In Philco, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: "When ... the work stoppage takes the form of a strike, the
burden is upon the union to show that it made the initial "peace" move by offering to continue the
status quo." 430 Pa. at 104, 242 A.2d at 456 (emphasis in original).
257. Justice Wright, quoting the syllabus of Shannon, stated: "The burden of proof is upon
the claimant to establish the right to unemployment benefits under the unemployment compensation law of Ohio." Bays, 53 Ohio St. 3d at 140, 559 N.E.2d at 748 (Wright, J., dissenting).
In Pennsylvania, as well, the burden of proof is upon the claimant in an unemployment compensation case. See, e.g., Bishop, 90 Pa. Commw. 553, 557, 496 A.2d 110, 112 in which the court
stated: "A claimant whose employment has been interrupted by a work stoppage arising out of a
labor dispute bears the burden of proving that the stoppage resulted from a lockout."
(quoting McCormick Dairy Lines v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 74 Pa.
Commw. by
181,eCommons,
184, 459 A.2d
74, 76 (1983)).
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into whether an employer offers to maintain the status quo. This unfortunate result could lead to an erosion of the basic tenet that claimants
bear the burden of proof in unemployment compensation cases. This, of
course, would place the employer in the predicament of having to prove
that it offered to maintain the status quo in order to thwart a claimant's request for benefits. Although it is difficult to predict exactly what
the final effect is likely to be, by both adopting the status quo test
enunciated in Vrotney, which requires courts to examine employees' offers to maintain the status quo, and examining the employer's offer to
determine whether there was a lockout, the Bays court has sent mixed
signals which will create uncertainty in the area of unemployment compensation law for some time to come.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The court in Bays validated the status quo test for determining
whether a work stoppage is due to a lockout under the labor dispute
disqualification provision of the Ohio Unemployment Compensation
Act. Although the court correctly stated the status quo test and appropriately sanctioned its'adoption in Ohio, the court ignored Pennsylvania
case law regarding issues that were decided in the very state that created the status quo test. The court rendered its decision without any
explanation of why the issues necessitated opposite conclusions in Ohio.
The court's misinterpretation of the status quo concept will yield uncertainty within the area of unemployment compensation law which will
translate into more litigation over issues within this area of the law.
Pennsylvania case law regarding the status quo test provides a wealth
of precedent. It is quite conceivable, however, that Ohio courts will
often be compelled to choose a new course to fit the needs of Ohio. In
doing so, better explanations for decisions breaking from Pennsylvania
precedent would provide a great service to the legal community as such
explanations would account for greater certainty in the area of unemployment compensation law.
Adam Seth Levy
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